Public Bill Committee

[Ann Winterton in the Chair]

Further written evidence to be reported to the House for publication

GLA 5 Institute of Historic Building Conservation.

New Clause 6

Utilities
‘(1) The GLA Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 351(3), after paragraph (k) insert—
“(l) the efficiency of the suppliers of water and energy,”.
(3) In section 351(4), after paragraph (c) insert—
“(cc) the suppliers of water and energy to Greater London or any part of Greater London,”.
(4) In section 61, after subsection (5) insert—
“(5A) This subsection applies to persons holding the office of regulator of any supplier of water or energy to Greater London or any part of Greater London.”
(5) In section 61(1) for “or (5)” substitute “, (5) or (5A)”.’.—[Tom Brake.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question proposed [18 March], That the clause be read a Second time.

Question again proposed.

Ann Winterton: I remind the Committee that with this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 7—Water and sewerage strategy—
‘(1) In section 41 of the GLA Act 1999 in subsection (1) after paragraph (ef) insert—
“(eg) the water and sewerage strategy prepared and published under section 361F below.”
(2) In Part 9 of the GLA Act 1999 (environmental functions) after section 361E insert—
“361F The water and sewerage strategy
(1) The Mayor shall prepare and publish a document to be known as “the water and sewerage strategy for London”.
(2) The water and sewerage strategy for London shall contain—
(a) the Mayor’s assessment as to the consequences of actual and planned development of whatever nature upon the water and sewerage infrastructre within Greater London; and
(b) the Mayor’s proposals and policies for ensuring the water and sewerage infrastructure is adequate for the development referred to in subsection (a) above.
(3) The Secretary of State may give to the Mayor guidance—
(a) about the content of the strategy; and
(b) in relation to the preparation or revision of the strategy.
(4) The guidance that may be given under subsection (3)(b) above includes—
(a) guidance specifying or describing the bodies, persons or organisations which the Mayor must consult; and
(b) guidance as to the consequences of development to which the Mayor must have regard.
(5) In preparing or revising the strategy the Mayor must have regard to any guidance given under subsection (3) above.”.’.

Tom Brake: I had nearly concluded my remarks, but shall recap for the benefit of Members.

Ann Winterton: Order. I am reliably informed that the hon. Gentleman had drawn his conclusions to an end in the previous sitting.

Michael Gove: It is entirely understandable that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington should have risen at that point because when the clock stopped at five o’clock last week, he was frozen in the middle of what I considered to be an exemplary analysis of the requirement for the Mayor of London and the Greater London authority to have a water sewerage strategy.
 Talking of things being frozen, many of us might remember that in April 2006 there was a magnificent ice sculpture on the other side of the Thames that contained galleries, a bar, an auditorium and, of course, a skating rink. To construct that magnificent ice sculpture and provide that tourist attraction, it was necessary to have 200,000 litres of water frozen. What was striking was that the water was not British, but had had to be imported from Canada simply to provide that attraction and amenity for London citizens. I mention that because London, like many parts of east and south-east England, is in the grip of an acute water shortage.
 Just one month after we all enjoyed the ice installation, the Environment Agency pointed out that there is less water in London, per head of population, than in parts of the Sudan, Morocco, Egypt and Kenya. When one thinks of the water situation, particularly given the last couple of weeks, they are probably more inclined to think of flooding, inundation and the effect that they have on homes and other insured properties. Flooding is certainly a problem across the country, but the acute water shortage faced by Londoners is chronic and goes beyond seasonal alterations in rainfall.

Martin Linton: Did the hon. Gentleman write his speech before the hosepipe ban was lifted three days ago, or did he not notice?

Michael Gove: I am well aware that the ban has been lifted and I am very grateful for it. I am particularly grateful that Sutton and east Surrey had their ban lifted, allowing the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington to water his garden this weekend, if he so wishes. However, he will not need to, for the reasons that I mentioned earlier—we had rather a lot of rainfall in Surrey, where I was lucky enough to spend the weekend. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford, from a sedentary position, refers to Surrey, where I spent many happy hours.
Funnily enough, on Friday night, while other hon. Members were perhaps watching “Ugly Betty” or “Celebrity Big Brother”, I was presiding over a flood forum dealing with issues of flooding that have afflicted many parts of south-east England. But as I said, while climate change can lead to flooding in some parts of the country, it is also contributing directly to the water shortages being faced by Londoners.

Andrew Slaughter: I rise in part to query whether the hon. Gentleman writes his speeches. I thought that they were more streams of consciousness. On London’s water problems, does he agree that if one single factor contributes to it, it is privatisation? My problems with Thames Water are mainly down to the fact that its ownership changes regularly and that the priorities of the management are always its share price and investors, not the people to whom they supply water.

Michael Gove: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point in attempting to row back on privatisation. Of course, the question that we must ask is whether it is now Government policy to invest a considerable amount of public money in renationalising those companies.
I incline to the view—I think it is also Government policy—that privatisation can bring particular benefits, but one needs a strong and effective regulator and a clear role for publicly accountable and elected representatives. On the specific point about Thames Water, the company faces real problems in delivering water to Londoners and I am aware that it loses something like 197 million gallons of water every day. However, one point that we must bear in mind is that the infrastructure of Thames Water has suffered because of a lack of investment over many years, indeed over generations, in London’s water and sewerage infrastructure. That lack of investment pre-dates privatisation.
One of the arguments for privatisation, not just of water but of railways, was that private companies could bring capital in, which would enable them to invest in upgrading an infrastructure that had been neglected when water and rail were in public ownership. An argument that transcends party politics—it is now just a matter of accepted common sense—is that, when certain utilities are in public ownership, what one may apparently gain in terms of public accountability, one also loses in certain respects. That is because it is sometimes the more unfashionable utilities—utilities that must rely on Treasury funding to ensure that their infrastructure is up to scratch—that lose out in the allocation of public money. That has certainly been the case when one looks at the history of both water and rail in this country. During the period when British Rail was nationalised and water was a utility in public hands, I would submit that both parties—Labour and the Conservatives—failed to invest adequately. Since privatisation, private sector capital has played a part in improving the water infrastructure.
I entirely sympathise with the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush when he argues that there is a lot more that Thames Water can do. Thames Water serves my constituents in the same way that it serves Londoners, and it is undoubtedly the case that many of my constituents would like to see Thames Water raise its game.
One way that Thames Water could be more effectively equipped to raise its game would be if it operated in partnership with a Mayor who had the power to set a strategic water and sewerage policy. New clause 7 would give the Mayor that power. In many respects, it is complementary to new clause 6. Although vanity of ownership would incline me to believe that new clause 7 would be a more effective way of achieving those aims, if the Government were minded to accept new clause 6 and reject new clause 7, then, in the spirit of public-spiritedness, I would entirely acquiesce in that manoeuvre. If you are the Minister, you pays your money and you takes your choice between those two options.
The position that Londoners face when it comes to their water supply is precisely the type of issue that should allow us to transcend party political trenches. That is why, although the Conservatives have been characterised as being opposed to Mayor Livingstone and anxious to clip his wings, we are joining the Liberal Democrats in proposing that this Mayor or future Mayors should have greater power and authority to shape a water strategy.
The hon. Member for Battersea pointed out that the hosepipe ban has been lifted recently, and we all welcome that development. However, many of us would ask why the hosepipe ban, which we would expect to be an emergency measure introduced only perhaps during the summer or periods of drought, lasted until the middle of January. Those of us who remember last summer in London will remember the use of standpipes, the fact that vans were delivering drinking water to some neighbourhoods and that those vans had “Ban the drought” on the side of them. We will all remember the effect that hosepipe bans had on particular households.
 I suspect that we are also all aware that the level of water usage in London is particularly high, in both national and European terms, with figures suggesting that the average Londoner uses between 160 and 170 litres of water a day.
There are already agencies that have helped to ensure that Thames Water fulfils its obligations, not just to its shareholders but to its stakeholders, as I am sure the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush would wish to see. Ofwat has made a number of suggestions as to how Thames Water might raise its game. However, with respect to the hon. Gentleman, Thames Water is not the only player in this game. There are things that can be done by others. For example, we can try to ensure that new housing developments are as water-neutral as possible. We can introduce measures in such developments that will enable people to monitor more accurately, and thereby limit, the water that they use without having an adverse impact on their lifestyle or their family obligations.
Moreover, London’s water position links in with the water position of neighbouring areas. To meet London’s water needs, Thames Water is planning to build a reservoir in Oxfordshire. It therefore seems appropriate that the Mayor should have a role in negotiating with other local government and central Government bodies to ensure that any water strategy for London is a joined-up phenomenon.
 We heard earlier in the debates on both planning and housing about how London, if it is to survive as a  successful global city, will need new housing development. If it is to have such development and if that development is not to impact adversely on the quality of life of London’s existing residents, we need a coherent way of dealing with water and sewerage supply. Our new clause and that tabled by the Liberal Democrats offer competing but complementary ways of providing provide that, and I hope that the Minister will look favourably on either of the proposals.

Jim Fitzpatrick: Good morning, Lady Winterton. It is a pleasure to see you this morning, refereeing our final sitting.
 The new clauses would extend greatly the Mayor’s responsibilities for energy and water companies. New clause 6 would require him to detail in his state of the environment report the efficiency of suppliers of water and energy services in the Greater London area. The Mayor is already required to report on water quality, emissions to water, ground water levels, energy consumptions, emissions of greenhouse gases, and any other matters in relation to Greater London that he considers appropriate. That requirement already ensures that the Mayor will be reporting on fundamental energy and water issues relating to London.

Tom Brake: Clearly, the Minister is setting out the effect of the new clauses, but does he agree that one significant omission in the Mayor’s responsibilities is water leaks over which he currently has no remit?

Jim Fitzpatrick: I hope to explain later to the hon. Gentleman why we think that what the Mayor does at present is adequate and why the additional requirements proposed under new clauses 6 and 7 would be burdensome, bureaucratic and unnecessary. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will attract my attention if I do not respond fully to the issues that he has raised.
 It is unclear what value the new reporting requirements would add. The new clause would duplicate the ongoing work carried out by the economic regulators for such sectors. Extensive reports on the efficiency of water and sewerage companies are already published by Ofwat. Each year, water companies in England and Wales, the Environment Agency and the drinking water inspectorate provide information to Ofwat on the performance of companies against various aspects of service and performance. Through that process, Ofwat can make comparisons and assess publicly the efficiency of individual companies against well-established standards of performance.
Ofgem similarly oversees the efficiency of the national transmission and regional distribution of energy in the United Kingdom, and the operation of effective competition in the UK wholesale and retail energy markets. It ensures that suppliers meet environmental obligations, for example under the energy efficiency commitment. Ofgem produces regular reports on the state of competition and quality of service in the United Kingdom energy markets.
The interests of London water and energy consumers in respect of the companies that serve them are already defended ably by Ofwat, the Consumer Council for Water, Ofgem and, pending the creation of  a new consumer body that will replace it, Energywatch. The Secretary of State has also directed the Consumer Council for Water to maintain a statutory regional committee in the Thames area. It is difficult to see how providing the Mayor with similar duties in respect of water and energy companies could be justified.
 New clause 6 would simply create additional bureaucracy and, I suggest, could be seen to be a waste of public funds. It would also give the assembly powers to require water and energy regulators to appear before it and to produce documents. Currently, the assembly has powers to summon certain categories of people to give evidence at its meetings and to produce documents as we discussed earlier in Committee. However, at present. they are people with whom it has a direct relationship, such as assembly members and contractors.
 The new proposed power is wide-ranging and would set an important precedent, significantly widening the power of the assembly to require organisations working in London, with which it does not have such a direct relationship, to appear before it. It would also be an entirely new departure to extend the power to national and independent economic regulators who, by virtue of their statutory duties, are answerable to Parliament rather than the assembly. Those regulators regularly appear before various Committees of the House to report on their functions. Water and energy companies also occasionally appear before Committees to contribute to other aspects of those Committees’ work.
New clause 7 will give the Mayor a duty to produce and keep under review a water and sewerage strategy that will include proposals and policies for ensuring that the water and sewerage infrastructure is able to cope with “actual and planned” developments. That would, in effect, make the Mayor another water regulator in an already heavily regulated area. The water sector in England has three core regulators: Ofwat, in relation to economic regulation; the drinking water inspectorate, which looks after drinking water quality; and the Environment Agency, which is responsible for water resources and the environment.
 On development, the Environment Agency is already a statutory consultee in relation to sewerage infrastructure and water and sewerage companies are consulted locally when new developments are being considered. The Environment Agency advised Ministers as recently as last September that large-scale water transfers for south-east England are not currently necessary before 2025. However, development matters relating to water and sewerage infrastructure are already under consideration by regulators and the companies. Water companies already produce long-term water resources management plans and that is due to become a statutory requirement, with effect from April this year. Those statutory plans, which will be published, already make provision for additional people living in and around London and the south-east.
The regulation of water is also more complex than that of other utilities. Regulation is based on water company areas, which are largely based on river catchment boundaries rather than political borders. Any policies or proposals that meant increased expenditure in London, for example, by Thames Water, would have an impact on the water bills of all Thames Water customers, including those outside the Mayor’s jurisdiction.
The net effect of new clause 7 on the regulation of water would be to reduce the discretion of regulators and water companies without giving the Mayor any additional real powers. It would also duplicate much of what happens already. It is possible that there would be implications for customers who fell outside the Mayor’s jurisdiction.
I understand that the Mayor intends to produce a non-statutory water action framework for London. That could usefully add to the debate on water resources and water efficiency. The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has already said that he will take that into account in the run-up to the next price review for the water sector. I hope that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington will ask leave to withdraw the motion and clause.

Tom Brake: I understand what the Minister said regarding the extra regulation that would be created if my amendment were included in the Bill. I will not pursue new clause 6, but I hope that the Minister asks the regulator about the failure to date of Thames Water significantly to eat into its high leakage rate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 12

Amendment of TCPA
‘(1) TCPA 1990 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 12(3C) leave out “be in general conformity with” and insert “have regard to”.
(3) In section 13(1A) leave out “is in general conformity with” and insert “has regard to”.
(4) In section 13(5A) leave out “is not in general conformity with” and insert “does not have regard to”.
(5) In section 15(2A) leave out “are in general conformity with” and insert “have regard to”.
(6) Leave out section 21A.
(7) In section 26 leave out subsection (2)(bb).
(8) In section 74 leave out subsections (1B) and (1C).
(9) Leave out section 322B.’.—[Michael Gove.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 14

Vacation of office by Mayor following petition and recall ballot
‘After section 16 of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“16A Vacation of office following petition and recall ballot
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for, or in connection with, requiring the Mayor on receipt of a petition which complies with the provisions of the regulations and a recall ballot of eligible voters in London to vacate office, in such circumstances as may be prescribed in the regulations.
(2) The provision which may be made by regulations under subsection (1) includes provision—
(a) as to the form and content of petitions (including provisions for petitions in electronic form),
(b) as to the minimum number of electors entitled to vote for the Mayor under this Act who must support any petition presented to the Mayor during any period specified in the regulations,
(c) for or in connection with requiring an office of the GLA to publish the number of electors who must support any petition presented to the authority,
(d) as to the way in which electors are to support a petition (including provision enabling electors to support petitions by telephone or by electronic means),
(e) as to the action which may, may not or must be taken by the Authority in connection with any petition,
(f) as to the manner in which a petition is to be presented,
(g) as to the verification of any petition,
(h) as to the minimum and maximum number of days in which a ballot should be held,
(i) as to the format and wording of the recall ballot,
(j) as to the date on which, or the time by which, the Mayor must vacate office,
(k) for or in connection with enabling the Secretary of State, in the event of any failure by the Authority to take any action permitted or required by virtue of the regulations, to take that action.
(3) The number of electors mentioned in subsection (2)(b) is to be calculated at such times as may be provided by regulations under this section and (unless such regulations otherwise provide) is to be 10 per cent. of the total number of electors participating in the Mayoral election preceding the date of any petition.
(4) Nothing in subsection (2) or (3) affects the generality of the power under subsection (1).”.’.—[Michael Gove.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 15

Limits of the general power (No.2)
‘After section 31(6) of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“(6A) The Authority shall not by virtue of section 30(1) above incur expenditure in promoting activities or relationships which are primarily the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the Department for International Development, although this does not prevent the Authority incurring expenditure in co-operating with or facilitating good relations with other major world cities and regional authorities.”.’.—[Michael Gove.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Michael Gove: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I apologise for not welcoming you to the Chair at the beginning of the sitting, Lady Winterton. I was temporarily distracted by the confusion, as much in my mind as in that of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, about which of us was speaking at the moment when the clock froze the debate last Thursday. I associate myself with the Minister’s comments—it is a great pleasure to see you refereeing what I suspect will be the final stages of our deliberations.
New clause 15 is an attempt to deal explicitly with a controversy that has arisen around this Mayor. It has been our intention throughout the debate to separate as much as possible the personality of this incumbent from the broader office of the Mayor, for obvious reasons. However popular this incumbent might have been, one cannot expect him to continue in office throughout our lifetime, and we need legislation that is appropriate for whoever might occupy the office. Inevitably, though, for as long as there has been a mayoral office in London, Ken Livingstone has been the occupant, and his exercise of those powers has to an extent defined in the public mind what the Mayor’s job could and should be.
There is legitimate controversy about many of the Mayor’s decisions and the powers that he has exercised. We have had an opportunity to revisit some of those matters—the congestion charge, housing, planning—and we accept, although we as Conservatives might take a different view, that the Mayor is within his rights to exercise the powers allotted to him by the House to shape London in line with the vision that is his mandate.
However, we are genuinely concerned that the Mayor is overreaching himself by attempting to use the office of Mayor of London—and, by association, the prestige of our capital city—to pursue a foreign policy that is out of kilter with the views of a majority of Londoners and in opposition to the Government’s own stated goals. We are all aware that in the 1980s various local authorities attempted to use public money to effectively turn local authorities into lobbying groups for international policies. There were lively debates about whether that spending was legitimate or ultra vires. The new clause would clarify for this Mayor and, if the Government are willing, other local government figures, what is legitimate in spending on contact with foreign cities and other nations.
It is entirely appropriate for this Mayor and other local figures to develop close ties and bonds with comparable cities and bodies in other nations to help them in the exercise of their duties. Whether it be town  twinning, visiting other cities that have hosted the Olympics or travelling to New York or Sydney to discover how one city hones its policing or another its planning policies, such activities are entirely legitimate. There has recently been controversy about the amount of time that the Mayor spends in the air, and the Greater London assembly has pointed out that in the past year he has been responsible for something like 13 or 14 intercontinental flights. It is not our business on this occasion to object to the Mayor travelling: it is how he uses his journeys abroad that concerns us.

Greg Hands: Does my hon. Friend agree that it is not so much the Mayor holding foreign policy views that we object to as when they conflict with his primary duty to serve the people of London? In November I chaired an open meeting relating to a bus route in my constituency, the C1. Everybody was there: myself, the two leaders of the council, the neighbouring council and two officers from Transport for London. Unfortunately the current incumbent Mayor was unable to be there because he was on a flight to Cuba.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. Most Londoners would consider that if the Mayor had a choice between travelling on a British Airways flight to Cuba and working out how to make the C1 bus route work more effectively, his job would be to concentrate on the C1 rather than turning a flight to Cuba into his own version of Air Force One.

Tom Brake: Might not the Mayor have been in Cuba seeking to secure a deal for cheap oil on which to run the C1?

Michael Gove: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. I shall come to the role that the Mayor envisaged Venezuela playing in London. One of the technical problems with the Mayor’s attempted oil deal with Venezuela, which on the surface might have been attractive to some Londoners, was that any petrol that he managed to secure would have been subject to excise duty and other taxation. That would have meant that any saving for Londoners was minimal. Whether those excise duties are too high is a matter for the Treasury. I simply point out that, not for the first time, the Mayor was on a fool’s errand in economic terms.
The hon. Gentleman and I have mentioned Cuba and Venezuela, and we must address how the Mayor has used his office to carve out a distinctive foreign policy for London. It is not one that reflects particularly well on London, because there has been a striking connection between the people whom he has seen. He has sought to use the prestige of his office and the money of London taxpayers to support and burnish the reputation of some of the least attractive leaders in the world. Cuba is a country that, for understandable reasons, occupies an honoured place in the minds of some people on the radical left. It is entirely understandable that the romance of the Cuban revolution, which led to the replacement of the Batista regime, can still entrance and enchant some. The reality of the revolution is now the betrayal of many dreams: the incarceration of gay men and women, the suppression of dissent and the limiting of political freedom where it matters most.

Andrew Slaughter: I fear that the hon. Gentleman might be falling into the trap that he accuses the Mayor of falling into. I am not sure why the history of the Cuban revolution is relevant to the Bill. I hold no brief for Hugo Chavez, but I can see why the Mayor might sympathise with a left-wing politician who has been the subject of vilification and abuse by extreme right-wing forces for a long time. I am not aware that there are any plans by the Conservative party to kidnap the Mayor of London in a coup, as happened to Senor Chavez, but if it does happen, I hope that my constituents will march peaceably on central office until he is released.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. His view seems to be at variance with the official position of his party. He shows a degree of sympathy for Fidel Castro but the truth is that, in answer to my question on 12 January, the Minister for Europe wrote:
“The UK remains committed to the 1996 EU Common Position, which aims to encourage a process of...transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba.”—[Official Report, 16 January 2007; Vol. 455, c. 989W.]
The hon. Gentleman may well romantically associate Fidel in his mind with Ken and see them both as left-wing martyrs who are subject to vilification, but if they are subject to vilification, it is coming from his right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe as much as from Washington DC or Conservative central office.

Andrew Slaughter: On a pure point of correction, I do not think that I mentioned Fidel Castro at all in my intervention. I was concentrating on purely Bolivarist movements in South America. I would like to go on at greater length about them, but I fear that I may be falling into the same trap of a discourse too far.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for what I think was an attempt at clarification but I suspect that he was being a trifle disingenuous. His comparison of left-wing leaders who are subject to right-wing vilification was intended to allow us to see Ken and Fidel in the same light. If it was not, all I can say is that he should have made it clearer who he was talking about. I hope that he and other hon. Members will join me in making clear our unhappiness about what has been happening for the past 20 years in Cuba under Fidel and his associates. I mentioned the incarceration of homosexuals. Recently—

Ann Winterton: Order. What happened in Cuba is not relevant to the new clause, the phrases of which are somewhat wider. I should be grateful if Mr. Gove would return to the subject in hand.

Michael Gove: I certainly will, Lady Winterton. I am grateful to you for that gentle reminder. However, Cuba is material to the exercise of the Mayor’s powers because, as we know, he recently travelled to Cuba and, when he did so, he made a conspicuous and deliberate choice about whom he saw when he was there. He deliberately chose to see a group of individuals who were family relations to those known as the Miami five. The individuals whom he saw were the relatives of those who had been arrested by America on suspicion of terrorist activity.
 It could be argued that it was fair enough for the Mayor to have spent some time visiting those people but it is striking that when he was in Cuba, he did not choose to see the women in white—the recipients of the Sakharov prize given by the European Parliament to those who have genuinely been struggling for human rights. The women in white are the relatives of 75 distinguished liberal academics and journalists incarcerated by Fidel Castro for speaking up for human rights. The question that we have to ask is what message does it send when the Mayor makes such a decision? If he is going to spend public money travelling to Cuba, we have a right to ask why he is using our council tax to fund that jaunt. When the Mayor goes to Cuba and the people whom he chooses to visit are those who support repression and the people whom he chooses to shun are those who champion democracy, we have to say that London’s reputation suffers as a result.
It is not just Cuba: the Mayor’s thwarted intention to travel to Venezuela, alluded to by both the hon. Members for Carshalton and Wallington and for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush, also raises troubling questions. The president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, with whom he was attempting to negotiate a particular oil deal, is an individual who recently embraced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, and made common cause with him. As I am sure the Committee knows, Ahmadinejad is a holocaust denier who said that Israel should be wiped off the face of the map. Is it appropriate for the Mayor of London to champion someone like Chavez, who is happy not only to share a platform with a holocaust denier, but to embrace him?

Karen Buck: If we are going to play this game, does the hon. Gentleman condemn the previous Conservative premiers’ embrace of General Pinochet?

Michael Gove: I believe that what happened under the Pinochet regime in Chile was a gross abuse of human rights. There is now a welcome greater recognition across the parties that human rights are integral to any modern foreign policy. If are talking about the sins of the fathers, I point out that it was a Labour Government who enabled President Ceausescu to come here to meet the Queen and to receive an honour. In that respect there are skeletons in both parties’ closets. My point, which goes to the heart of the new clause, is that whatever past Conservative or Labour Governments might have done, they were the duly elected Governments of their country with the responsibility to discharge foreign policy, and both were subsequently defeated at the ballot box. The difference with the Mayor is that he is attempting to frame his own foreign policy when it is entirely outside the scope of the office that was originally envisaged.

Greg Hands: Does my hon. Friend agree with me that the key difference is that the various people he has described may or may not have had views on foreign policy, but what offends so many Londoners is council tax payers’ money being spent on promoting those views, and holding lavish conferences and receptions for the people whose views are often very offensive to Londoners?

Michael Gove: My hon. Friend makes an absolutely valid point. The embrace of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by Hugo Chavez will have offended the majority of moderate Muslims in London and given other communities in London, notably the Hindu, Sikh and Jewish communities, pause for thought. They might have been inclined to notice that embrace more than others because of a previous hug that the Mayor himself indulged in. He physically embraced Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organisation that has extensive international links. Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is on the record as supporting suicide bombing, the physical chastisement of homosexuals and of husbands hitting women in the home with an open hand—he said explicitly that a slap is an acceptable way of enforcing discipline at home. Most of us would find those views at best mediaeval and at worst barbaric, yet the Mayor chose deliberately to embrace that individual as part of what he construed as his own distinctive contribution to foreign policy.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham says, the expense of bringing Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi over here is one thing, but the message that that embrace sent out about London and what the Mayor of London considered to be an effective model of multiculturalism is one that many of London’s minorities found deeply worrying.

Martin Linton: Would these views not be better expressed in a press release issued at the hon. Gentleman’s expense? Has he any idea how much it costs to run a Committee like this, which has been discussing Chile, Cuba, Iran and various countries around the world? Surely he could do that in his own time?

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for being so scrupulous about the Committee’s time. If at any stage the Minister wishes to acknowledge that he will accept the new clause I will be more than happy to sit down to save myself the bother of developing the case and the hon. Gentleman the expense in time of listening to it. However, it is important to rehearse the case because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham pointed out, these issues go to the heart of the character of the current incumbent and to the heart of one of the weaknesses in the legislation that governs what he can do.

Andrew Slaughter: I hesitate to spring, or to rise gradually, to the hon. Gentleman’s defence. He has sat through the porridge of the Bill so far and this is his jelly and ice cream; this is what he enjoys doing. It is a little bit of froth on the top. He dismissed the comment of my hon. Friend the Member for Regent's Park and Kensington, North rather too lightly. He cannot completely exculpate himself from his party’s link to, say, the regime of General Pinochet, who died recently. A great apologist for him, Lord Lamont, said that in South American terms the 300 or 3,000 people or whatever it was that Pinochet bumped off was a relatively trivial matter. Is that the official view of the Conservative party? There is a direct link of hagiography from Lord Lamont to the right hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) to the hon. Gentleman. I think that he ought to be a little more precise.

Michael Gove: I suspect that I would tax the Committee’s patience too much if I were to embark on a lengthy explanation of the precise nature of all the crimes of the Pinochet regime. Suffice it to say, as I tried to point out to the hon. Member for Regent's Park and Kensington, North, past Conservative Governments have made specific foreign policy mistakes, some of which I have had the opportunity to point out elsewhere in Committee. For example, they could be taxed with their attitudes towards the Balkans, particularly Slobodan Milosevic, but now is not the time—

Ann Winterton: Order. I again point out to those contributing to the debate that the clause is about the authority incurring expenditure and so on. Discussion of the character of the present Mayor and the foreign policy of previous Governments is not in order. I shall be grateful if members of the Committee, having made their points, move on.

Michael Gove: I am grateful, Lady Winterton. I mentioned the particular case in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham and the concerns of London council tax payers. One such concern will be the projected cost—£2 million—of a festival that the Mayor proposes to hold in 2009 to celebrate 50 years of the Cuban revolution. With your permission, Lady Winterton, I thought it appropriate to outline the Mayor’s views because I, and many Londoners, consider the nature of many of the regimes that he has feted to be unacceptable. The money is being spent on a cause and for a purpose that is entirely out of sympathy with the views, I believe, of a majority of Londoners.
At the beginning of my remarks I pointed out that in the 1980s there were lively debates about whether it was appropriate for local government to spend taxpayers’ money on pursuing foreign policies, or whether such expenditure was ultra vires. Central to that question was the importance of drawing a distinction. Local government can legitimately undertake activities to bolster civic pride and establish commercial and personal links between particular local government areas and comparable areas abroad. Twinning and fact-finding missions are entirely legitimate. What we content is not appropriate is use of the mayoral office and council tax payers’ money on the prosecution of a foreign policy that runs counter not only to the stated foreign policy of the Government in power, but to the values that people in Britain and in London increasingly consider to be integral to civilised life.
 The Mayor of London held a conference on Saturday, entitled “A World Civilisation or a Clash of Civilisations?” The Mayor used that conference as a platform to outline some views that I and, I suspect, the majority of Londoners do not share. I recognise as entirely legitimate that the Mayor may hold conferences in London on how London, as a multiracial, multicultural and multi-ethnic city, can be better governed and more harmoniously led. To do that is entirely within the ambit and scope of what is appropriate for the Mayor. However, the present or any future Mayor using public money to travel abroad and laud regimes that most Londoners and Britons find offensive is not appropriate, nor is then putting London council tax payers’ money into festivals intended to celebrate the achievements of regimes that the majority of our fellow citizens consider not worthy of celebration, but, rather, worthy of working to change.

Tom Brake: I echo the comments of pleasure about your chairmanship this morning, Lady Winterton. You have clearly set a standard and will not allow the Committee to stray far from its brief.
The hon. Member for Surrey Heath is normally very persuasive. However, in the course of his argument in favour of new clause 15, my position changed from support to opposition. I might characterise the new clause as the Evening Standard new clause because it is intended to create a headline about not wanting a Mayor who spends more time in Havana than Havering, or more time in Caracas than Kew—a place that the Mayor has never visited.
I understand what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve. He will probably agree with me that in practice, the present Mayor or a future one will pay for any foreign escapades at the ballot box. That is the appropriate place to pay for any excesses. If we examine the proposed new clause, we find that it would introduce a degree of uncertainty. For instance, it would be difficult to confirm whether the Mayor has overstepped the mark by encroaching on something that is primarily the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or whether the expenditure that he incurs in co-operating with other major world cities is legitimate. The hon. Gentleman will realise that if the proposed new clause were accepted, the Mayor could proceed exactly as now. He would be able to say that he was having a series of meetings with key people in a major city, as opposed to encroaching on work that would be better done by the FCO and the Department for International Development.
I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is seeking to make with the proposed new clause, but its weaknesses render it unusable. Should the hon. Gentleman press it to a Division, I will not support him.

Bob Neill: I shall be brief in voicing my support for new clause 15 because the basic principles have been well rehearsed. I am disappointed by what the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington says about it because the Liberal Democrats in the assembly have condemned some of the Mayor’s more outlandish escapades just as vigorously as the Conservatives have. Members of the Labour group on the assembly have looked embarrassed, as I hope some Government MPs are.
The Mayor’s behaviour is representative of a cast of behaviour that damages the institution of the mayoralty. When any Mayor does something that Londoners regard as wholly off the wall, it causes them to think that everyone at city hall is a waste of space and to ask what they pay their council tax for. That is a shame and a matter of regret for those of us who supported the creation of strategic city-wide governance for London at a time when it was not fashionable within my party.
My concern is that the Mayor damages the argument for having an effective, strategic authority for London by going off on his digressions. One cannot help but feel that way. In the eight years the Mayor has been in office, he has visited Bromley three times and Bexley twice. People in those parts of London will compare them to the other places the Mayor has visited and question his priorities. That argument is not a game or a bit of knocking copy. The Mayor not only damages himself at the ballot box—though I hope he does—but damages the institution, which is the more serious point. The fact that he does so by visiting some particularly authoritarian types makes it all the worse.
 I was particularly concerned about the Mayor’s recent jaunt, which I raise here because we have not yet had a satisfactory response. I shall not go into the details of his trip to Cuba, but considering some of the comments made by Labour Members, it is ironic that when the Mayor was asked about it in the London assembly meeting, he spent the bulk of his reply rubbishing the Foreign Office’s considered assessment of the human rights situation in Cuba. He specifically rubbished quotations from the Foreign Secretary that I read to him. I simply throw that into the ether for the consideration of Labour Members so that they know what their friend is doing.

Michael Fabricant: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Andrew Slaughter: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Bob Neill: I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield, who caught my eye first.

Michael Fabricant: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I have spent some time touring Cuba. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is only too easy for someone such as the Mayor to go there from London and get the impression that Cuba is a free society because people are quite open, but be totally unaware of the number of writers and artists who are held in prison in that undemocratic land? Is it not a waste of the Mayor’s time and resources for him to spend his time doing that rather than caring for the people of London?

Bob Neill: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Sometimes the Mayor’s extraordinary naivety in that regard—I am trying to be charitable—reminds me of people such as George Bernard Shaw in the 1930s who told us what a wonderful place the Stalinist Soviet Union was, perhaps hoodwinked by the same type of extremely controlled visit. The message is exactly the same.

Andrew Slaughter: On a point of clarification, I have never had the pleasure of attending a session of the GLA. Is the one that the hon. Gentleman describes typical, with members reading quotes from the Foreign Secretary about Fidel Castro and getting a response from the Mayor? Before he criticises expenditure, perhaps he would like to put his own house in order and remove the plank from his own eye.

Bob Neill: That was an ingenious attempt to make a tackle, but it went wholly into the mud. The whole point of the question that I asked was to get the Mayor to give an account of the expenditure that had been incurred and the priorities that caused him to incur it. I imagine that it is not unknown for quotes to be read out in Hammersmith and Fulham council meetings, which seems to be the fount of most of the hon. Gentleman’s experience. I shall take no lessons from him on that.
 The interesting thing about the Mayor’s attempt to enter into contractual relationships with the Government of Venezuela was that he was not dealing with another municipality or city. It was not the sort of deal that might be done between the Greater London authority and the authority of Shanghai, New York city, Bombay or another major city. It was an attempted deal between a local authority in the UK and a national Government, or at any rate the national corporation that controls the oil. That is bizarre, and I have not had a satisfactory answer from the Mayor on whether he sought advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of Trade and Industry or—I shall come to my reason for including this last Department—the Home Office.
 It was not only the contract that was of concern. The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington might recall that in the assembly debate the leader of the Green party group made the fair comment that the Mayor did not seem to understand that oil was not necessarily compatible with a climate-friendly approach. The Mayor seemed to think that there were two types of oil—nasty capitalist oil, which was bad, and good socialist oil, which was to be welcomed. I hope that on reflection the hon. Gentleman will support us on the new clause.

Tom Brake: May I bring the hon. Gentleman back to the effectiveness of the new clause? He has referred to the DTI. Negotiating oil deals might be that Department’s responsibility, but the new clause refers only to the FCO and DFID and so does not appear to cover the scenario to which he is referring.

Bob Neill: If the hon. Gentleman wishes to reconsider his vote, we will be happy to table a more comprehensive new clause on Report to include all the appropriate Departments.
 Martin Linton rose—

Bob Neill: I shall give way in just a moment once I have finished my point.
Having gone down that route, the Mayor was condemned in the Assembly. It would not be a bad idea to prevent future Mayors from getting themselves into that mess.

Martin Linton: I just wonder if the hon. Gentleman has any idea of the cost to the public purse of running a Committee for half a day? His speech is in danger of forcing us to meet this afternoon.

Bob Neill: It is interesting how sensitive Government Members are on this topic. The Committee has a timetable for a full day’s business, but given the promptness with which the Committee has dealt with the Bill, we should finish our proceedings well within that timetable. I am sorry that Government Members are so sensitive about the subject that we are discussing.
I have one final point that it is important to make while the Minister is here because he might not be aware of it. Many of us were particularly concerned when the Mayor indicated that he was prepared to enter into an arrangement with the Government of Venezuela to make available to them Metropolitan police expertise and data on surveillance, fingerprinting and other technical matters. The Government of Venezuela’s human rights record has been criticised by Amnesty International—an organisation with which the Mayor is not unfamiliar and which can hardly be characterised as right wing. It is genuinely troubling if a Mayor of London seeks to make such material available to a foreign Government with a question mark—to put it mildly—over their human rights record, and does so without consulting Her Majesty’s Government. That has implications for Government policy and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. There ought to be mechanisms to restrain such behaviour. I have never succeeded in getting a satisfactory explanation of what attempts, if any, the Mayor ever made to consult with Her Majesty’s Government on something that could, for obvious reasons, have damaged significantly not only London’s reputation, but the United Kingdom’s. That is why we have proposed the new clause and why I hope that hon. Members will support it.

Norman Baker: First, I apologise to you, Lady Winterton, and to the hon. Member for Surrey Heath for not being present for the beginning of his contribution this morning. I am happy to take part in the debate. Secondly, I wish to defend Conservative Members. I do not do it very often, but let me do it quickly. The House of Commons operates a democracy and we are entitled to use the time available for what we think is appropriate. The Bill has been timetabled for a particular length of time and if Conservative Members want to occupy it with the debate that they have introduced this morning, that is a matter for them. If I may say so, it is not for others to bring in arguments about how much a particular debate might cost. That is entirely inappropriate.
Having defended Conservative Members, I shall now disagree with the case advanced this morning by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. There is a danger of confusing the occupant of an office with the office itself. Comments this morning have been largely critical of the activities of the Mayor. I am not going to defend his activities in all respects. I do not think that some of his foreign affairs expeditions and activities are appropriate. I would even go as far as to use the word “escapades”, which I think was used by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst.
The Committee might recall, however, that last week we had a debate on climate change, during which I argued strongly, as too did Conservative Members, that it was inappropriate for the Government to set terms of reference for the Mayor’s climate change strategy and that he should be free to pursue a policy on, say, energy or transport that might differ from the Government’s if he thought it appropriate for London. We argued that the Mayor has his own mandate through the ballot box and is fit to discharge it, and the people who should judge whether he discharges it appropriately or whether he is abusing his position to undertake activities that are irrelevant to London are the electors of London when they next vote for a Mayor. The same argument applies today.
I do not think it is appropriate that the Mayor has undertaken some of the activities he has but he should be free to behave badly, if that is how people wish to interpret it. He should be free to undertake escapades, to use the expression of the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst. He should be free to liaise with unpleasant, dictatorial, authoritarian regimes if he thinks that he should. I happen to think that he is entirely wrong on that. I think he is entirely out of step with the people of London in following that course, but he has his mandate to do so and he will pay the price for that accordingly—and indeed does pay the price by way of the negative coverage that appears in the newspapers and the damage to his personal reputation. 
I also think it is dangerous to try to talk about the regime. We should stick to principles here. Members have criticised the Mayor for meeting particular regimes that are authoritarian by nature, as indeed they are, and which have rather unpleasant aspects to them, but would the same criticism apply if he met people from Italy or from Canada or from New Zealand or other countries where the same criticism on the same human rights basis would not be applicable? I did not hear criticisms of that. I hope that we are not saying that the Mayor is free to meet foreign leaders or undertake a foreign policy where Members would not object to the people he is meeting but not free to meet those to whom they would object. Surely the principle is whether or not he is free to undertake meetings at all on a foreign policy basis. I happen to think that he is because he has his own mandate; because London is a very important city in the world; and because there is a great deal of decentralisation in most countries of the world, beyond that which there is in this country in terms of the power exercised by leaders of major cities. Indeed, leaders of major cities across the world would expect the Mayor of London to deal with matters beyond whether the dustbins are emptied on time. It is a great pity that the Mayor of London, and indeed our local elected representatives at all levels, do not have the freedom in this country that they have in other countries, and we should move towards that.
It would be entirely respectable and understandable if leaders of other major cities in the world wanted to discuss foreign policy and foreign matters with the Mayor. As I say, he will pay a price or otherwise for that. I urge Conservative Members not to play the ball but to play the game, as it were, on this particular occasion because we had an unfortunate incident 25 years ago when the then Conservative Government took great dislike to the same individual, Ken Livingstone, when he was running the Greater London council. They objected to how he was using his powers in the Greater London council and the consequence of that was that Mrs. Thatcher decided to abolish the Greater London council. In my view, that was an entirely wrong decision to have taken. She should have criticised the leadership, if she wanted to. She did do so and I would have to agree with her on many occasions regarding Ken Livingstone’s activities in that incarnation as leader of the Greater London council. Just because the occupant at the time was behaving in a way that many people would find unacceptable, however, is not a reason to abolish the authority. Similarly, because the present Mayor of London is not to everyone’s taste and is not particularly to mine in many respects either, that is not a reason to impose curtailing powers on what a Mayor might do. I ask Members to look at the general principles rather than the personalities; to consider the principle, apart from anything else, of devolution and of his own particular accountability and mandate. For those reasons I cannot support the new clause.

Greg Hands: I join other Members in welcoming you back to the Chair, Lady Winterton. You will be delighted to hear that I am not going to speak at length and nor am I going to discuss items of foreign policy because I think that is slightly missing the point about this amendment. This amendment is in a tradition of regulations governing local authorities on things like ultra vires. It is about what local authorities, in this case the GLA, or the Mayor of London can or cannot spend. The key part, in my view, of this proposed new clause are the two words “incur expenditure”. I do not think that anybody is disputing the fact that the present Mayor or future Mayor or, indeed, anybody here may or may not have views on the big foreign policy issues of the day. The key question, in my view, is whether he or she should be allowed to incur expenditure in promoting those views. I agree with the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush’s criticism of those at the assembly who sought to initiate a debate about human rights in Cuba, when real the point was whether the Mayor should incur expenditure in promoting a particular view about Cuba. This is really a debate about what local authorities should be able to spend money on.
We are talking about considerable sums. The conference last Saturday, “A World Civilisation or a Clash of Civilisations?” to which my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath referred, was held at lavish expense at the QEII conference centre; the entire centre was booked out to discuss foreign policy. An elite panel of speakers from around the world came to the conference, which included sessions on democracy in the middle east. I am a huge believer in promoting democracy in that region, but I have never used council tax payers’ money to do so, which is the key point behind the proposed new clause.
Many council tax payers in London are feeling the effects of rising council tax, although my own council, Hammersmith and Fulham, has just achieved a 3 per cent. cut. Residents are appalled that, at the same time as their hard-working, newly elected council has achieved that reduction, the Mayor has hiked his take in the GLA precept by more than 5 per cent. Part of that rise is undoubtedly due to huge extravagance on the part of the Mayor in running events such as that at the QEII conference centre.
I am surprised that the Liberal Democrats do not support the proposed new clause, as it would protect council tax payers’ money. It is in the ultra vires tradition, in which I assume they believe. It would give protection against local authorities spending council tax payers’ money on things that were well beyond their remit. I therefore support the proposed new clause.

Yvette Cooper: I welcome you to the Chair, Lady Winterton. I will follow your guidance in refraining from tours of Cuba, Latin America, the Balkans and whatever other countries Opposition Members may suggest.
The hon. Member for Surrey Heath has said throughout the passage of the Bill that he does not want to be capricious, to personalise the debate, or to single out particular individuals. That is exactly what he has done, however. I agree with the hon. Member for Lewes that a political debate about an individual has been confused with a debate on the sensible legislative proposals that the Committee must consider. 
The hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham attempted to make the proposed new clause an issue of principle, which I assume is to distinguish between the interests of the Foreign Office on one hand and good relations between cities on the other. I am sure that hon. Members want to be consistent and, as the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said, would apply that principle to any mayor, be it the Mayor of London, a borough mayor, the mayor of a local council or the lord mayor of London. In order to depersonalise the issue, it is worth considering the impact of that approach on the lord mayor of London and his foreign visits. In his speech to the City banquet in September, the lord mayor said:
“During this year so far, some 72 heads of government...or...ministers from 39 countries have called on the Lord Mayor...I am in the final stages of an annual programme of visiting 23.”
In an earlier debriefing after a series of trips, he said:
“Welcome to this debrief on the Mayoral visits to Kuwait in January; Libya, Tunisia and Malta in February and Iran; Oman and Qatar in April and May.”

Greg Hands: Fundamentally, the Minister does not understand the nature of the City of London corporation. The role of the lord mayor of London is to promote London as a financial centre, which is what the visits are all about. The visits are paid for by businesses located in the square mile, which are more than happy to see London promoted as a financial centre competing with the relative attractions of Frankfurt and New York. Those visits are very important. It is events such as the clash of civilisations conference in the QEII conference centre that she appears to support and that the amendment is seeking to stop.

Yvette Cooper: The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about the promotion of London, whether as a financial centre, a great location to do business, the best possible location for the Olympics or a great capital city. He is absolutely right—we do believe that that is important. Many of the issues raised by the lord mayor of London on his overseas trips are ones in which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a strong interest. Many of them could well be regarded as primarily the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The point is that the new clause’s approach is simply not practical. It is not sensible and confuses personality debates with the attempt to provide sensible legislation for the future of the mayoral role.

Michael Gove: The Minister acknowledges that the lord mayor of London has a valuable role in burnishing the reputation of the City as a centre for investment. Does she believe that the current Mayor of London—the only person to have exercised those powers so far—has burnished the reputation of the City by, for example, embracing the international head of the Muslim Brotherhood or visiting the families of people detained under terrorist offences?

Yvette Cooper: Once again the hon. Gentleman wants to engage us in a discussion about the particular individual who is the current Mayor rather than the clause before us. That is what he has attempted to do throughout the debate. I presume that that is his motivation, other than simply to show us that he is a frustrated shadow Foreign Secretary and would like any opportunity to tour the world with his further examples.

Martin Linton: I thank my hon. Friend for that. Is it not also true that the lord mayor of the City of London often gives the impression on foreign trips that he or she is speaking for the entire population of London? Often they speak not only in the interests of the City but against, for instance, Canary Wharf in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Minister for London, which is a competitor to it. The lord mayor of London often actually damages the interests of the rest of London, and it is only right in those circumstances that the true Mayor of London should have the flexibility, when he judges it to be right, to promote the interests of all Londoners and not just those of a section.

Yvette Cooper: I shall resist the temptation to comment on the individual decisions and outings of any mayor, whether it be the lord mayor of London or the Mayor of Greater London. It is not the purpose of the Committee to allow me to comment on any of those visits or approaches. I will say simply that the issues raised may well be issues of strong interest to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and would therefore be covered by the clause.

Greg Hands: It is unfair and wrong of the Minister to seek an equivalence between the role of the lord mayor of London and the elected Mayor of London. The lord mayor is doing a brilliant job in promoting London as a financial centre, the envy of the world; New York City has just launched its own large-scale inquiry into why it is falling behind London as a financial centre. To equate his work in any way with the activities of the elected Mayor of London and his foreign policy activities is fundamentally wrong and undermines the role of the City of London Corporation in promoting Britain as a financial centre.

Yvette Cooper: I will take the hon. Gentleman’s remarks as an indirect compliment to the hard work of the Government’s City Minister, who has indeed been working hard alongside the lord mayor, whether in New York or in other countries, to raise issues about the City. I do not think that the debate is about the individual trips that any mayor, lord mayor, mayor of a borough or mayor of a council across the country should take. It is about the appropriate framework for the legislation. We do not think that it would be appropriate, as Conservative Members seem to be suggesting, to introduce restrictions on mayors who are directly elected that we would not introduce on those who are not. On that basis, the Government oppose the amendment.

Michael Gove: I am disappointed that the Minister declines to speak warmly of the amendment, let alone to support it. I am surprised that she seeks to shelter behind the lord mayor’s carriage to avoid expressing any view on issues of political moment to Londoners. In a way, I am not surprised that she has done so. It seems to be a rather tragic example of political cowardice at a time when the country is crying out for political leadership that she should decline to offer any opinion about one of this country’s most famous Labour politicians and his embrace of authoritarian regimes and mediaeval theocratic ideologues, but I think that Londoners can draw an appropriate inference from her silence on such matters. Her Pontius Pilate approach does not reflect well on her or the Government.
It is quite clear from the Government’s approach that they are perfectly happy to play a double game. They are happy to allow Ken Livingstone to run a foreign policy in London in order to gather votes from one particular constituency and at the same time, with the voice of the Foreign Office, to run a foreign policy more closely in tune with the country’s interests. Londoners will draw an appropriate conclusion about the cynicism of the Government from the way that the Mayor is operating at a deniable distance for electoral reasons. For that reason, I believe that this debate has served its purpose. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 20

Abatement of salary for any councillor with executive responsibilities
‘After section 25(1)(c) of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“(d) as a member of a local authority in receipt of an allowance for executive responsibilities.”.’.—[Mr. Pelling.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Andrew Pelling: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Lady Winterton. I am cognisant that there are still further clauses for consideration, so I shall attempt to be brief in speaking on clauses for the rest of the day.
A good deal of attention was given to abatement of GLA members’ salaries when the Greater London Authority Act 1999 was considered. The then Minister for London, the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Mr. Raynsford), when pressed by the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), gave good guidance on the issue of MPs drawing full pay, either as members of the London assembly or indeed as Mayor, for two public posts. He said:
“It is proper that people should not be paid from the public purse for performing two functions without an abatement of their salaries.”—[Official Report, 4 November 1999; Vol. 323, c. 568.]
I must declare an interest in the matter as a member of the London assembly. Currently, assembly members who are Members of Parliament receive two thirds of the normal salary—they are abated by a third. Indeed, the finance officer of the GLA, the excellent Anne McMeel, was in my office the day after the general election to advise me of the good news that the abatement would take place. She gave the information with great enthusiasm. At least there was some saving for the London authority.
What has changed since the 1999 Act is that, quite properly, we have seen a significant increase in allowances for members of local authorities. That is most justified by the work that they do. Allowances for executive council members are now realistic in reflecting the amount of work done under the stronger executive model pursued by the Government. Thus by changes under the Local Authorities (Members’ Allowances)(England) Regulations 2001, following the guidance from Professor Malcolm Grant in his brief, “Making allowances: the remuneration of councillors in London”, and in work currently being done by Rodney Brooke CBE, significant allowances are now being paid to councillors. In London, under the current recommendation, the basic rate is £10,000: in some councils the rate is above that and in others it is below. However, payments for executive members can be anything from £32,000 to £51,000 per year. An executive member of a local authority who also sits as a London assembly member could receive some £100,000 a year from the public purse. It might be worth considering whether, in the changed circumstances since the 1999 Act, the abatement should also apply to senior executive members—not ordinary back-bench-level councillors or people chairing the licensing committee—who should be providing such a saving to the public purse.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling the amendment, as it provides an opportunity for me to highlight one of the Government’s proposed minor changes from the GLA review, which we intend to take forward through an order following the passage of the Bill.
We propose to abate the salary of the Mayor or an assembly member who is also a Member of Parliament or a Member of the European Parliament by two thirds of salary, rather than one third. That proposal reflects one of the key recommendations of the Senior Salaries Review Body’s last report, in 2005, on the remuneration of the Mayor and assembly members. The SSRB’s reasoning for the level of abatement to increase to two thirds of salary, which the Government accept, was that membership of the assembly should generally be considered to be a full-time role and that it is unlikely that the Mayor and assembly members will hold dual mandates beyond a short period. It would also bring the GLA in line with the salary abatement arrangements for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.
We are aware, of course, that the hon. Members for Croydon, Central and for Bromley and Chislehurst are also assembly members and are accordingly subject to this order. I reassure them that the Government do not intend to bring a revised order into force until after the next mayoral and assembly elections in 2008.

Andrew Pelling: That is most gracious.

Jim Fitzpatrick: We will also consult widely before making the order.
I am afraid that the Government cannot accept the amendment. As the hon. Gentleman said, the amendment would add local councillors who receive any allowance for executive responsibilities to the list of memberships explicitly referred to in section 25 of the 1999 Act which could be subject to the order by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State already has the power to include councillors who are in receipt of an allowance for undertaking executive responsibilities, under section 25(1)(c), which allows the Secretary of State to specify the membership of other public bodies beyond the UK/European Parliaments to be covered in the order. Accordingly, the amendment is not strictly necessary and only highlights the fact that this category of political representative may be affected by an order under section 25.
Furthermore, the Government have no plans to extend our proposed revised order on the abatement of salaries to cover councillors who are in receipt of an allowance for undertaking executive responsibilities. Such an extension would raise a number of complicated issues, such as the treatment of councillors who undertake executive functions on a part-time basis, which would need to be considered carefully, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman would accept.

Tom Brake: Does the Minister agree that the hon. Member for Croydon, Central mentioned a councillor with executive responsibilities on a salary of £51,000? That is the exception, not the rule.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is accurate. To reinforce the point that he has raised, the Senior Salaries Review Body has also not considered the issue to date. It seems sensible, from our point of view, for the SSRB—as an independent body with considerable expertise in deciding such matters—to consider the issue in any future reviews of the Mayor and assembly members’ remuneration before Ministers consider any legislative changes. If in future the board decides that such a legislative change is justified, I am sure that Ministers would want to consider the issue again. With that explanation, I request that the hon. Member for Croydon, Central consider withdrawing the motion.

Andrew Pelling: I think the Minister’s suggestion that it might be of interest to the Senior Salaries Review Body is appropriate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 21

Postponement of poll from 2012 to 2013
‘(1) Section 3 of the GLA Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) The poll due on 3rd May 2012 shall be held on 2nd May 2013 or such later date in 2013 as the Secretary of State may by order provide.”.’.—[Mr. Pelling.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Andrew Pelling: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am particularly keen to look at the matter of call-in, which would give the London assembly an opportunity to enjoy many of the powers that local authorities—[Interruption.] That is, I will be looking forward to doing so once I have addressed the matter of the poll date—I just wanted to emphasise how much I was looking forward to doing so.
 The eyes of the world will be on London when the London Olympics take place in 2012. The Mayor—whoever he or she might be after the 2008 elections—is likely to follow a pattern, already established and typical in any mayoral system, of having a number of advisers around him or her who are part of a team that will inevitably move on if there is a change in the person holding the mayoral post after the election in May 2012.
 Martin Linton rose—

Andrew Pelling: I should like to progress my argument and will then take guidance from the hon. Gentleman. To continue, we would have a great deal of change and discontinuity at an important time in the run-up to the Olympics in the late summer. I am very grateful for the strong support for this clause from London First. It also says that the eyes of the world will be on London as the Olympic and Paralympic games are staged in August 2012.

Martin Linton: Does this new clause mean that the Conservatives have given up hope of finding a credible candidate not only for the mayoral election of 2008 but also for the election in 2012?

Andrew Pelling: The clause is entirely without party politics; it is all about improving the prospects for London in undertaking the games. I have no desire to be partisan on this clause.
 The success of the games will be important for the UK’s international reputation. Within a partisan election, it is inevitable that the Mayor will be distracted by the election taking place just a few months before the Olympics take place. There is the prospect of a great deal of distraction from the important attention that we should ask the Mayor to give to the Olympic games.
I know that it is important always to be cautious about changing the rhythm of the electoral cycle, but if we set the term of office for the assembly and the Mayor well in advance and know that the elections in 2008 are for a five-year term, we will take partisan politics, as exemplified by the intervention by the hon. Member for Battersea, out of the Olympics, as they are too important for London and the United Kingdom to be sullied by a party political campaign.

Tom Brake: I listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman to see whether he had an overwhelming case for lengthening the standard cycle for the mayoral and GLA elections, because it is a bad principle to vary that cycle. Although the Olympics are a very significant event, many other very significant events could occur which might lead the hon. Gentleman to deploy arguments in favour of a postponement for another reason at some time in the future.
The hon. Gentleman did not present an overwhelming case and we should therefore stick to the principle that if an agreed cycle for elections has been established it should be maintained. He may find that he has been doing the Government’s job, as they may well seek to make this change themselves in the future. The hon. Gentleman might feel that it is more appropriate to let the Government take the risk associated with the decision rather than acting as an outrider for them.
 The hon. Gentleman made some interesting points but the case is not so overwhelming that we should be willing to postpone the elections until 2013. If he presses the new clause to a Division, I will not support it.

Yvette Cooper: The Government are also opposing the new clause for similar reasons to those given by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. I recognise the spirit in which the proposal was tabled and acknowledge that there are serious issues to be considered to ensure that the Olympics are a success. However, we should give serious regard to the fact that the four-year electoral cycle was set as part of previous legislation and be careful about what precedents would be set.
The hon. Gentleman did not make an overwhelming case for considering the Olympics as exceptional circumstances that justify changing from the ordinary electoral cycle for the GLA and the Mayor. The Olympics do not depend on any one individual; many organisations are involved, including the Olympic authorities and the GLA, and they will need to work together to ensure that the Olympics in 2012 are a success.

Andrew Pelling: In the interests of expediting the business, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 24

Appointment of Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis
‘(1) The Police Act 1996 (c.16) is amended as follows.
(2) For section 9B(5) substitute—
“(5) Before recommending to Her Majesty that she appoint a person as the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, the Secretary of State shall have regard to—
(a) any recommendations made to him by the Mayor of London, and
(b) any representations made to him by the London Assembly.”.’.—[Mr. Pelling.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 30

Call-in of decisions
‘After section 59 of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“59A Call-in of decisions
(1) Decisions made by the Mayor (except for planning decisions) may be called in for scrutiny by the Assembly following written request of 13 members of the Assembly being received by the Chief Executive of the Greater London Authority for consideration and review within 14 days of the decision.
(2) The Assembly shall meet in plenary session within 14 days of the call-in to debate the decision.”.’.—[Michael Gove.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Michael Gove: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Ann Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 43—Directions issued by the Mayor to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority—
‘After section 404 of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“404A Directions issued by the Mayor to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority
(1) Before issuing a direction to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority under or by virtue of this Act, the Mayor shall act in accordance with the following subsections.
(2) The Mayor shall send a copy of any proposed direction to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority to the London Assembly.
(3) The Assembly may within 21 days of receiving a copy of any proposed direction to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority recommend that the proposed direction should not be issued or should be issued with such modifications as the Assembly shall determine.
(4) The Mayor shall have regard to any recommendation made by the Assembly under subsection (3) above.
(5) The Mayor shall within 21 days or receiving a recommendation made by the Assembly under subsection (3) above prepare a statement which must include an explanation setting out the reasons why any recommendations made by the Assembly is not accepted.”.’.
 New clause 44—General power for the Assembly to call in directions—
‘(1) After section 404 of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“404A Directions issued by the Mayor
(1) Before issuing a direction under or by virtue of this Act, the Mayor shall act in accordance with the following subsections.
(2) The Mayor shall send a copy of any proposed direction to the Assembly.
(3) The Assembly may within 21 days of receiving a copy of any proposed direction recommend that the proposed direction should not be issued or should be issued with such modifications as the Assembly shall determine.
(4) The Mayor shall have regard to any recommendations made by the Assembly under subsection (3) above.
(5) The Mayor shall within 21 days of receiving a recommendation made by the Assembly under subsection (3) above prepare a statement which must include an explanation setting out the reasons why any recommendation made by the Assembly is not accepted.”
(2) After section 421(2) of the GLA Act 1999 insert—
“(3) In any direction given under this Act by the Mayor, the reference to a ‘direction’ shall include the following—
(a) any guidance issued by the Mayor under this Act to any body as to the manner in which that body is to exercise its functions;
(b) any general directions issued by the Mayor under this Act to any body as to the manner in which that body is to exercise its functions;
(c) any specific directions issued by the Mayor under this Act to any body as to the exercise of that body’s functions.
(4) In this section and in section 404A any reference to ‘this Act’ includes any provisions which, by virtue of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (as amended from time to time), have been or are inserted into any other Act of Parliament or statutory instrument.”.’.

Michael Gove: Throughout the progress of the Committee, one of the points that we have emphasised is the requirement for balanced new powers for the Mayor and new powers of scrutiny for the assembly. The three new clauses would give the assembly the power to call in mayoral directions and to subject them to appropriate scrutiny. Over the past two and a half weeks, the Opposition’s commitment to giving the Greater London assembly greater powers of scrutiny has been testified to by the weight of argument put by myself and my hon. Friends. All I would say is that the Minister is probably familiar, if not wearily familiar, with the arguments and I look forward to hearing him once again demolish them when he takes from his civil service brief yet another series of impeccably framed arguments against scrutiny and in favour of the unfettered exercise of Executive power.

Andrew Pelling: This is familiar territory for me, having spoken only a few moments ago. I want to draw particular attention to new clauses 43 and 44 regarding the power of the assembly to call in directions and guidance to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority and other GLA functional bodies. Providing the Mayor with the power to direct LFEPA will give him or her considerable new direct powers over the authority. He obviously already has such powers in relation to Transport for London and the London Development Agency.
I know that colleagues on the Greater London assembly do not oppose that power in principle, but they wish to ensure that there is an appropriate degree of transparency and accountability. The Mayor might use the power of direction to compel a functional body to take a particular course of action against its own will. In those cases, there should be a mechanism for reviewing the direction before it takes effect.
Local authorities throughout the country already have the power, including those with directly elected mayors. In those circumstances, the executive is required to publish a forward plan of its forthcoming decisions and the council has the power to call in any of those decisions. The new clauses therefore do not represent an innovation; they would merely extend the powers available to local councils, in relation to their executives, to the role of the London assembly in its relation to the Mayor.
 In local authorities, the power to call in decisions has not led to undue delays in the decision-making process. It has simply introduced a degree of transparency and accountability. That is perhaps even more important in respect of the current Mayor than it might be in local authorities. The new clauses would not take power away from the executive. The assembly would not be empowered to block any mayoral decision. Instead, it could ask questions within a reasonable time scale of 21 days and make recommendations to the Mayor either to revise the direction or not to issue it all. The final decision would, however, rightly rest with the Mayor.
 Unlike local authorities, which have the power to call in all executive decisions, the power would relate only to directions to functional bodies, not to all mayoral decisions. Very few directions have been issued to the London Development Agency or to TFL by the current Mayor. An average of five directions were issued in each year from 2000 to 2005. The power is used generally in exceptional circumstances. Accountability is perhaps most important when exceptional steps are being taken by an executive. It is in those circumstances when Londoners would expect the London assembly to undertake a role of scrutiny and expose the decisions to public debate.
 There are two separate proposals, one relating to LFEPA and one relating to all functional bodies, and that deserves some explanation. The boards of Transport for London and the London Development Agency are appointed by the Mayor without reference to political balance. The board of LFEPA is mainly made up of politicians in proportion to their representation on London councils and the London assembly.
In the cases of TFL and LDA, there is therefore less risk of a fundamental disagreement between the Mayor and his appointees. Since the Mayor is the only party with a democratic mandate, his will is likely to prevail in any consternation with TFL or the LDA. As for LFEPA, it is entirely possible that there could be political disagreements between the Mayor, with his direct mandate, and LFEPA, with its indirect democratic mandate. The power of direction would be used to resolve such disagreements. I am sure that the assembly would not argue against the Mayor being empowered to so direct LFEPA to do certain things. However, in the case of LFEPA, when there is more potential for directions to be controversial politically and unwelcome, it is particularly important that the Mayor’s directions are subject to proper transparency and debate before they take effect. Thus, the opportunity is given to the Committee to give consideration to the special circumstances of LFEPA. Before I conclude, I shall give way.

Tom Brake: I sensed that the hon. Gentleman was about to conclude. I had hoped to intervene on the speech of the official Opposition spokesman, but his contribution was so succinct that I am intervening on the speech of the hon. Gentleman instead. I wish to bring him briefly to new clause 30. I am sympathetic to the group of new clauses, but it was not clear to me under that new clause precisely what additional powers would result from its introduction that do not already exist under section 59 of the 1999 Act. That allows the assembly to keep under review the Mayor’s exercise of statutory functions and it can produce reports and investigate matters of any actions taken by the Mayor. Will the hon. Member for Croydon, Central clarify what additional powers would result from new clause 30?

Andrew Pelling: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to develop my argument in respect of new clause 30.
The London assembly does indeed have the powers of scrutiny to which the hon. Gentleman referred, but there is a formality to the process of call-in. It would be more likely to prompt the current incumbent to provide a more detailed response to call-in procedure than saying, “I got elected, therefore I decide what to do.” It would not be possible to sustain that approach through a formal call-in process. With those comments, I conclude my remarks.

Bob Neill: I shall be brief, Lady Winterton. I apologise for not having welcomed you back to the Chair when I spoke earlier.
I wish to reinforce the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central. It has been a theme throughout our party that we do not oppose giving more power to the Mayor but seek to balance the power for the assembly to call in. When the matter was considered by the London assembly, support for this proposition and the principle of call-in powers was agreed only with the abstention of the euphemistically named “One London” group—the ex-UK Independent party, ex-Veritas group. In other words, every serious group of politicians, of all shades of opinion, supported the call-in powers. I hope that the Government will take that point on board.
If the Minister is about to spring into action, perhaps he will tell us why, if it was good enough for the executive-strong mayor of Lewisham, it is not good enough for the Mayor of London to have to deal with the call-in power on this basis?

Jim Fitzpatrick: The new clauses return the Committee to our debates on part 1 of the Bill, as the hon. Member for Surrey Heath said. Those debates centred on the respective roles of the Mayor and the assembly. It was made clear then that it is our belief that the current model for the Greater London authority works well, with a strong Mayor as the executive arm of the authority and the assembly holding him to account on behalf of Londoners. Our view is unchanged, but the new clauses would fundamentally alter the balance of power between the Mayor and assembly, and we cannot accept them.
I shall summarise each of the new clauses in turn. New clause 30 would allow the assembly to call in for scrutiny a decision made by the Mayor, except planning decisions, if at least 13 assembly members make such a request in writing to the chief executive within 14 days of the decision. The assembly must then meet within 12 days of the call-in to debate the decision. Such a provision would serve little purpose. The assembly may already scrutinise the decisions and actions of the Mayor, as the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington pointed out. Indeed, the assembly has a statutory duty to keep under review the Mayor's exercise of his statutory functions. New clause 30 would merely serve to formalise an existing process, and I see little merit in seeking to pigeon-hole assembly scrutiny of the Mayor into a rigid, time-bound process. 
 New clause 43 would require the Mayor to send to the assembly any direction that he intends to issue to the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority. Hon. Members will recall that clause 27 gives the Mayor a power of direction over LFEPA. The Assembly may recommend to the Mayor within 21 days of receiving the proposed direction that he should not issue it, or should issue it with amendments. The new clause also imposes a duty on the Mayor to have regard to the assembly's recommendations and, within 21 days of receiving them, prepare a statement giving reasons why any of the recommendations made by the assembly are not accepted. New clause 44 would make a similar provision in respect of any directions or guidance issued by the Mayor under the 1999 Act.
The new clauses would gravely hinder the Mayor, leaving him unable to act quickly and decisively when exercising his powers of direction. The Mayor would need to wait up to three weeks for the assembly to make its recommendation on his proposed direction, and he would not be able to issue directions in a timely manner.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent the assembly scrutinising retrospectively any directions issued by the Mayor. However, part and parcel of our model for London governance is that the Mayor, as the executive, should be free to act in a strong and decisive way, and that the Assembly should hold him accountable for his actions. Extending the assembly's power of scrutiny to decisions that he intends to make would change fundamentally the balance of power within the GLA—a balance that is proven to work for the benefit of Londoners.
I therefore urge the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to withdraw the motion.

Michael Gove: In one sense, the Minister did not disappoint me. Once again, with admirable clarity, he outlined the Government’s position. We have rehearsed the arguments before. We are naturally disappointed that the Minister will not accept what we believe is the logic of our argument. It is clear from earlier debates that when the Mayor needs to issue directions, not least to LFEPA, at moments of crisis, a responsible assembly would not seek to inhibit him—for example, if he was dealing with the aftermath of events such as 7/7. I accept that the Minister has the big battalions behind him, so I shall not push the point. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 31

Precepts
‘(1) The Local Government Finance Act 1992 (c.14) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 40(9) insert—
“(9A) The Greater London Authority shall have printed an explanation and billing notice dedicated solely to the annual precept raised by the Greater London Authority.”.’.—[Michael Gove.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Michael Gove: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Almost the best point in favour of new clause 31 was made in passing, but with some eloquence, by my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham. He pointed out earlier that the London borough of Hammersmith and Fulham is about to extend to those wise enough to vote for its current administration—and to those who do not vote for it—a 3 per cent. reduction in the council tax. That is a remarkable achievement. However, any resident of the borough who anticipates paying less will be gravely disappointed when the total bill is presented to them. As we all know, the likely GLA precept is to be 5 per cent. above the current level that is being paid, so the savings of Hammersmith and Fulham will be wiped out by Mayor Ken’s extravagance.
We believe that the new clause would ensure that, for busy council tax payers, it was clear where responsibility lay when a local authority was lowering its council tax, but the Mayor is increasing the burden. It is understandable when a council tax bill comes in and we see at the top of the bill the crest of our respective local borough that we are inclined to think, “Bloody Westminster” or, “Dear me, Hounslow has been overspending again”, when in fact Westminster and Hounslow may have been keeping their own houses in order, but have to act, in effect, as tax gatherers for the Mayor.

Andrew Slaughter: I can easily put the hon. Gentleman’s mind at rest. The extraordinary quantity of Pravda-like propaganda that comes out of a council in Hammersmith and Fulham leaves no opportunity not to inform residents in the most colourful language of exactly the point that the hon. Gentleman is putting forward. I wish that I had the time to point out the errors into which that council has fallen, but I fear that Hammersmith and Fulham has already taken up a lot our time already.

Michael Fabricant: On a point of order, Lady Winterton. It may be of interest to the Committee to know that Pravda is the Russian for truth.

Ann Winterton: That is not a point of order for the Chair. I call Michael Gove.

Michael Gove: Thank you, Lady Winterton. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that point of order.
I must confess that I would have thought that reading publications similar to Pravda was an enjoyable recreation for the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush. It would have probably reminded him of his undergraduate days. Nevertheless, he has once again eloquently, but perhaps unwittingly, provided me with an argument to underwrite the new clause. The poor residents of Hammersmith and Fulham need to have pointed out to them where accountability lies. If the new clause were accepted, there would be no obligation on Hammersmith and Fulham council to inform its residents exactly where the division of responsibility lay because it would be there in the council tax bill.

Andrew Pelling: I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way so speedily. Is he aware that both the Mayor and the London councils are in favour of separate billing in such a fashion? Does he not think that the Government should endorse the proposal, since they are keen to promote maximum participation in local democracy? By making clear the direct lines of accountability, as he suggests, and allowing for separate billing, they would only encourage people to participate in local elections.

Michael Gove: As ever, my hon. Friend makes an admirable point. Once again, it underlines two of the qualities that he has shown throughout our proceedings: his absolute commitment to improving the quality of local democracy and a keen understanding of the balance of opinion within London politics when it comes to the Bill and the new clauses. His argument could not be clearer or more effective.
Those people who might want to shield the Mayor from his own extravagance do not have an ally in him. This Mayor is proud of his extravagance. He is in the proud old Labour tradition of big spenders who consider their level of expenditure to be a virtue. In that respect, the widespread support for the new clause—given that it favours transparency, is supported by London councils and that the Mayor wishes to endorse it—should recommend itself to the Minister.

Karen Buck: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, in the interests of transparency, there is the truth and there is the whole truth? Following his argument, does he support the fact that local authorities such as mine, Westminster, would also be required to advertise to their local population something that they strikingly do not? I draw attention to the fact that 86 per cent. of all funding for services delivered in the borough of Westminster is delivered through local government grants. A mere 14 per cent. is actually raised from the council tax. Does he agree that, if we want a well-informed electorate who can exercise the need for control over their local authorities, they should be supplied with all the information and advice about their local authority finance?

Michael Gove: I do, indeed, agree with the hon. Lady; it is a pity that her Front-Bench colleague does not. Exactly that provision was contained in the Sustainable Communities Bill, which received its Second Reading on Friday. I take it from what the hon. Lady said that she will support that Bill when the opportunity arises, because it is certainly our wish to do so. It is a tragedy that the Department for Communities and Local Government is not doing so, and I suspect that it tells us something about its mixed priorities that last night in the House of Commons the Minister for Local Government made it clear that the Department regarded the Bill as overly bureaucratic and beside the point. To my mind, it was a tragic missed opportunity and a suggestion that the DCLG does not have at its heart the admirable commitment to localism displayed by the hon. Member for Regent's Park and Kensington, North.
Transparency in billing would serve the interests of accountability by ensuring that those Mayors who believe that high expenditure is the route to re-election would have the opportunity to campaign on that basis, and other Mayors—perhaps such as the Conservative Mayor, who is likely to triumph at the next poll—would have an opportunity to advertise their prudence and their value-for-money programme through a separately billed precept, and as a result would be able to win the election in 2012 and preside over our successful Olympics.

Tom Brake: I support new clause 31. It is straightforward and simple. It is about transparency in billing, which is something that we must all support and recommend. Most local authorities do that well through the leaflets that come with the council tax bill, certainly in Sutton, which explain what portion of the pie comes from grants and council tax and so on. I hope that Labour Members will also be willing to support the initiative. The fact that it has the support of the Mayor and London councils is significant. It would also give the Minister an opportunity to show that the Committee stage is meaningful and that the Government are willing to take on board sensible proposals that receive support from all quarters and are about making the important issue of the precept much clearer to our constituents.
Our constituents are very exercised indeed about by council tax increases above the rate of inflation, but often the arguments about a mayoral precept that has increased by 100 per cent. over four years are lost. The focus is on what the local authority is doing, and the Mayor is fortunate to be let off the hook. This is a sensible proposal. I cannot for the life of me think why the Minister would possibly want to reject the new clause, and so I look forward to hearing his message in support of it.

Jim Fitzpatrick: The Government accept that it is important for local taxpayers in London to understand to whom they are paying their council tax and the contribution that the GLA as a major precepting authority makes to council tax bills issued by the boroughs in London. Local taxpayers rightly need to understand where their council tax is going and what services it funds. Clear information is a vital prerequisite for that.
However, the Government cannot accept the new clause, which would require the GLA to print its own bill and explanatory notes dedicated solely to the GLA precept. Such a requirement on the GLA would be costly and potentially more confusing to council tax payers than the present arrangements. First, it is not clear how the new system would work in practice, as the boroughs would still remain legally responsible for the collection of the precept. If the intention is for the borough as the collecting authority to continue to issue the demand for payment, and for the GLA to issue an additional bill that would not actually be a demand for payment, we would be creating a recipe for potential confusion for the taxpayer. If, instead, the intention is for Londoners to receive two separate demands for payment, one in respect of the GLA and one in respect of the borough, but pay both to the latter, that seems even more confusing for taxpayers.
Secondly, the GLA has indicated that the additional costs of separate billing could be up to £10 million a year, depending on how the new duty was implemented, given that there are more than 3 million eligible households in London. That additional cost would have to be funded by either higher taxes or cuts to services, which nobody wants. My advice is that the Mayor does not support the provision in the new clause, which is contrary to what Opposition Members have said. I apologise for the confusion, but that is the information that I have been given. There is clearly disagreement on that.
Thirdly, it is not clear whether requiring the GLA to produce its own billing notice would improve local taxpayers’ understanding of their council tax bills. The GLA precept is already clearly identified on the current bills issued by boroughs.

Andrew Pelling: I do not want to argue with the Minister, but the Mayor of London has said openly in assembly meetings that he would be happy for the precepts to be produced separately. I was not trying to mislead the Committee.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I was not suggesting for a second that the hon. Gentleman was trying to mislead the Committee. Indeed, his explanation could well be consistent with the Mayor not supporting the new clause. He could be happy if it were passed without supporting it. There is no intention to mislead on either side. There have been occasions when Conservative Members have supported the Mayor’s view and we have opposed it, and vice versa. There is no inconsistency in saying that, whether or not the Mayor supports the new clause, we sadly do not.
As I was saying, the GLA precept is already clearly identified on the current bill issued by each borough. There is also a statutory requirement for information about the GLA’s budget, expenditure and the impact of changes in the amount of council tax charged to be included in the explanatory material that accompanies bills.
 Finally, the new clause would set a precedent for separate billing for other major precepting authorities—county councils, police and fire authorities—which would be costly and unnecessary. For those reasons the Government consider that it would be best to continue with the well established and generally efficient arrangements for collecting council tax in London whereby boroughs bill and collect the GLA precept on behalf of the GLA as part of their council tax billing notices. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to withdraw the motion.

Michael Gove: I am disappointed to hear the Minister’s response. It was intriguing that he spent most of it aiming at his straw man, which was that under the new clause the GLA would be responsible for separate billing arrangements. I hope that I and the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington made it clear that we wanted greater transparency within one bill, to be sent by the borough. We wanted greater detail about how the GLA disposes of public money through the precept.
It is clear that the Minister does not wish to accept the new clause. However, the hon. Member for Regent's Park and Kensington, North seemed to indicate in her intervention that she could see the logic in it, so we have hope and shall press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 32

Mayor to set the performance priorities for London Development Agency
‘The Mayor shall set the annual performance targets for the London Development Agency after consultation with the Secretary of State.’.—[Mr. Pelling.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Andrew Pelling: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I move the motion with the experience of having sat on the board of the London Development Agency, which sits in the wider regional development agency family. The targets that are set for the London Development Agency might be applicable to RDAs generally, but they have often been found not to sit so well with an agency that operates within a separate democratic process. There is significant input from the Mayor and the Mayor’s office. However, a lot of the reporting information that is required of the London Development Agency has been quite irrelevant to the needs of an agency that operates within the overall democratic structure of London’s governance.
It is also important that the London Development Agency should be able to secure its direction from the Mayor, in having targets set for it in respect of his or her desires for the performance of the London economy, and for the rejuvenation of those parts of London that are deprived and in need of special support. In that respect, I am again grateful for the strong support for the new clause from London First, which says that it is appropriate that the Mayor should set such priorities, rather than central Government, so that the work of the LDA is entirely consistent with the overall economic development strategy for the capital.
Our approach throughout the discussions on the Bill has been, where possible, to devolve powers from central Government to the Mayor, while also ensuring that the Mayor does not secure powers up from local government. The new clause therefore sits well within our overall philosophy for the Bill—to be radical and positive about extra powers for the Mayor, while ensuring that political decisions are made at the lowest political level, in terms of their closeness to the residents who elect the politicians.

Tom Brake: I shall speak briefly in favour of the new clause, which is a devolutionary measure that we support. We have taken guidance from the Liberal Democrat members on the GLA throughout, to ensure that what we say there is entirely consistent with what we say here. That is something that other parties might envy, particularly the Labour party, in that it ensures a consistent approach to such matters.
The new clause is important and would provide strategic direction for the LDA. It is true that the LDA has a lot of targets, but they seem to change with some frequency. It is not always clear from the agency’s budget what precisely it is seeking to achieve. On the basis that the new clause not only would give the agency greater direction and more focus, but would be a devolutionary measure, I should be happy to support the hon. Member for Croydon, Central, should he press the matter to a vote.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I am afraid that the Government cannot accept the new clause, which would enable the Mayor, on a statutory basis, to set the LDA’s annual performance targets, following consultation with the Secretary of State.
 The 1999 Act amended the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 to establish the LDA as a functional body of the Mayor. The office of the Mayor was given considerable statutory control over the agency—the Mayor appoints its members, approves its strategy, decides its budgets and can issue directions and guidance to it. The current Mayor has already used those powers effectively to ensure that the LDA is supporting the economic development and regeneration of London. Most notably, the agency played a crucial role in supporting the Olympic bid and assembling the land for the Olympic park. The Government expect the Mayor and future Mayors to continue to shape the agency so that it can better address the key challenges facing London’s economy.
However, the LDA is also an integral part of the wider regional development agency network for England, which receives considerable funding from the Government—more than £2.2 billion of taxpayers’ money this year, of which nearly £400 million is for the LDA itself—to support regional economic development and to contribute to national objectives such as increasing productivity. Given that considerable Government funding, it is important that the LDA, like other RDAs, supports underlying national objectives when taking action to improve London’s economy, which is why it is part of the wider RDA tasking arrangements. As a condition of the LDA’s grant, the Mayor has been required since the last spending review in 2004 to seek the Secretary of State’s approval for the LDA’s annual targets.
Those arrangements have given the LDA sufficient flexibility to develop its own programmes and projects and to address London’s specific challenges, such as affordable child care and the Olympic land assembly programmes. At the same time, they provide assurances to Government and ultimately Parliament that funding given to the LDA is contributing to underlying national objectives.
By putting the LDA’s performance targets on a statutory footing, the new clause would change those arrangements substantially. The Mayor alone would be responsible for setting the LDA’s performance targets following consultation with the Secretary of State. That arrangement would be enshrined in statute and would remove an important Government control that currently ensures that the LDA and national economic policies are complementary and mutually supporting. The merits of such a new clause must be carefully considered, and we suggest that that would be done best not as a last-minute change to the Bill but as part of a wider policy review.
The Government’s review of sub-national economic development and regeneration is considering the role of RDAs and other sub-national bodies involved in economic development and regeneration, and whether the framework and relationships between them and with central Government are the most effective for meeting the long-term economic challenges. The review may have wider implications for the LDA’s governance and performance arrangements, and we should not introduce a statutory change to the LDA’s output target arrangements before the outcomes of the wider review are decided. The sub-national review will report to Ministers before the comprehensive spending review later this year.
The hon. Member for Croydon, Central has raised the question of land disposal several times. I can advise him that TFL and the LDA have a different statutory disposal of land consent regime. Under section 5 of the 1998 Act, the LDA needs to seek the Secretary of State’s consent for the disposal of land only if that land is being disposed of at less than market consideration. Following the Government’s decision in the 2005 Budget to give the LDA more freedoms and flexibilities, that consent is only required for the disposal of lands worth more than £2 million on the open market. Local authorities are subject to a similar statutory consent regime.
I hope that that clarifies the position and assists the hon. Gentleman. However, as I have explained, the Government cannot accept the new clause as it stands and urge that the motion be withdrawn.

Andrew Pelling: I am grateful for the support of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. I know that the issue is well considered by his colleagues in the Liberal Democrat group on the London assembly. I hope that as the debates continue elsewhere, the Government will give clear cognisance to the value of such a devolutionary approach, which seems after all to be the theme that they also wish to pursue. With those comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 46

Budget and Performance Office (London Assembly)
‘(1) There shall be an office to be known as the Budget and Performance Office (London Assembly) to be headed by a Director who shall be appointed by the Assembly on a simple majority vote upon the recommendation of an independent Budget and Performance Office Advisory Board.
(2) The Director shall be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties assigned by the Assembly. The terms of office of Directors appointed shall expire upon each general election of the Assembly. Any individual appointed to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of a term shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term. An individual serving as Director at the expiration of a term may continue to serve until a successor is appointed.
(3) The funds available to pay for the expenses of the Budget and Performance Office (London Assembly) during each financial year shall not be less than the equivalent of 10 per cent. of the annual expenditure of the Greater London Authority Finance Department.
(4) The Director shall appoint such personnel and procure the services of such experts and consultants within the funds available as may be necessary for the Director to carry out the duties and functions assigned herein. Such personnel and experts shall perform such duties as may be assigned to them by the Director.
(5) The Director shall be authorised to secure such information, data, estimates and statistics from the functional bodies of the Greater London Authority as the Director determines to be necessary for the performance of the functions and duties of the office, and such bodies shall provide such information, to the extent that it is available, in a timely fashion.
(6) The Director shall not be entitled to obtain records which are protected by commercial sensitivity or material prepared for litigation.
(7) There shall be an independent Budget and Performance Office Advisory Board consisting of 10 members appointed jointly by the chairs of each of the Authority’s functional bodies and the Mayor.
(8) The members of the Budget and Performance Office Advisory Board must have extensive experience and knowledge in the fields of finance, economics, accounting, public administration and public policy analysis, and must include at least one former Finance Director of the Greater London Authority or of a comparable office in another local authority.
(9) It shall be the duty of the Budget and Performance Office (London Assembly) to provide to Assembly Members information which will assist in the discharge of their responsibilities which are related to the budgetary process, including—
(a) information with respect to the budget, consultations, strategies and policies with financial implications;
(b) information with respect to estimated revenues and receipts and changing revenue conditions; and
(c) to the extent practicable, such other information or analyses as may be requested.
(10) The Director, upon the request of Assembly Members, shall complete a financial impact statement of such proposed consultation, strategy and policy.
(11) The Director shall from time to time publish such reports as may be appropriate to enhance official and public understanding of the budgetary process and of the budget documents published in accordance with current legislation. The Director shall from time to time publish such reports as may be necessary or appropriate to provide such information, data, and analysis as will enhance official and public understanding of matters relating to expenditures, financial management practices and related matters.
(12) The Director shall publish an annual report on the performance of the Greater London Authority and the functional bodies of the Greater London Authority.
(13) The Director shall make all information, data, estimates, and statistics obtained in pursuance of subsection (5) and all studies and reports prepared by the office, available for public inspection, both in person and online.’.—[Mr. Pelling.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Andrew Pelling: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is very important for the operation of the London assembly. Analysing the overall performance and the budgetary performance of the GLA family and its functional bodies should be at the very heart of the scrutiny role.
 One criticism of the GLA budgetary process made by academics—most notably by Tony Travers—is its tremendous weakness in not providing a separate and independent office with the ability to provide advice to the GLA and to Londoners on the performance and the financial activities of the GLA. It is difficult to progress a budgetary process when one relies on officials who are intimately involved in the production of the Mayor’s budget, and are required to maintain complete secrecy about what is enclosed within that budget, while at the same time giving advice to the London assembly on the construction of an alternative budget.

Tom Brake: I seek clarification on one point. Is the hon. Gentleman proposing that we use the New York model, which I understand has an office distinct from both the mayor and the assembly? However, the relationship in the new clause between the assembly and the budget office seems to be much closer than in the New York model.

Andrew Pelling: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for mentioning the New York City charter. He is a little unfair in suggesting that the process I have outlined departs very far from the New York charter. While I would not wish to be charged with plagiarism, the structure of the new clause relies heavily on the provisions in that charter. Indeed, I positively decided to use that model because it has been so successful in the governance of New York city.
One of the benefits of that approach is that it will give ownership both to the assembly and to the Mayor by allowing the Mayor and the chairs of the functional bodies to appoint the board, which will appoint a director of the budget and performance office. There will be that involvement and support through that appointment process. Under the new clause, the director would be appointed in such a way that he or she was an independent person, free from party political affiliation, who had the particular qualifications to support that office.
The new clause would promote good discipline as regards the £11 billion that is spent annually on the London Assembly, £44 million for every sitting between election cycles of the assembly. Money would be directed to an effective budget and performance office that Londoners were able to recognise as an excellent and independent source of information on the performance of the functional bodies of the Greater London authority—an office that was free from the spin of the politics of the assembly or of the Mayor through The London Paper—so that people could feel confident that they were making a real judgment on the quality of the performance as regards £11 billion of public expenditure.

Tom Brake: In case the hon. Gentleman was about to conclude his comments, I just wanted to seek some clarity. The new clause refers to the office receiving the equivalent of 10 per cent. of the annual expenditure of the GLA finance department. My understanding is that there is no such thing as the GLA finance department, so did he mean to refer to the finance and performance department, which is a very large department? Is he including in his figures the people in the different functional bodies who work on financial matters? Will he give us an idea of the scale of the funding to which he is referring?

Andrew Pelling: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me the opportunity to provide further colour to the new clause. I was indeed referring to the finance and performance department within the strategic body of the GLA, and most definitely not to the finance departments and organisations within the functional bodies. There would be some significant expenditure involved, but the most important thing in that provision is that it ensures that there is some protection for the amount of money—serious money—given to that office.
 In conclusion, the new clause offers the prospect of providing a strong discipline to the assembly, so that its resources are deployed on its fundamental role of scrutinising the budgetary process. The ability to vote down the Mayor’s budget on a two-thirds majority is the only real executive power that the assembly has. That is important. The proposals would ensure that resources are not unnecessarily applied in respect of the political interests of assembly members. Rather, they would be applied to hold the Mayor to account on financial and overall performance, in line with the model that has worked so successfully in New York city.

Ann Winterton: Before I call anyone to speak, I think it would be helpful for the Committee to know that it is my intention to allow the sitting to run on a little longer if necessary. As Chairman, I have discretion to be able to do that, and I felt that it would make people feel more comfortable to know.

Jim Fitzpatrick: On a point of order, Lady Winterton. I advise you, Lady Winterton, as our referee, that in professional football there are now men who come out and hold up a board to indicate the amount of time remaining.

Tom Brake: We will not go beyond the agreed time as a result of my intervention. I rise simply to confirm that my earlier interventions were of a sympathetic nature, probing the new clause. Should the hon. Member for Croydon, Central have the time to press the motion to a Division, I will be inclined to support it.

Yvette Cooper: The hon. Member for Croydon, Central’s approach is based on models from the United States. Bodies such as the congressional budget office perform important functions in US political life and there are similar examples throughout the American political process, but he will appreciate that the structure and process are different here. From a legal perspective, it is possible for the assembly to set up its own budget research unit or office under its own ambit, using powers given by section 34 of the 1999 Act. The assembly can also use its scrutiny powers. The proposal in the Bill for the assembly to have its own budget could make it easier to fund a budget research unit.
The reason why the Government think that the new clause would not be appropriate is that, unlike America, we have a common legislative framework for local government finance and performance, to which the GLA and its functional bodies are subject. The GLA group’s financial performance and accounts are independently scrutinised by the Audit Commission. The group is also subject to the provisions of part 2 of the Local Government Act 2003, which mean that the GLA’s chief finance officer is under a duty to report to the Mayor and the assembly on the robustness of the authority’s draft final consolidated budget calculations. 
A statutory budget and performance office would cut across those existing provisions, potentially leading to duplication and confusion in the audit and scrutiny processes. For that reason, the Government are not convinced about the need for a statutory budget and performance office, and so ask the hon. Member for Croydon, Central to withdraw the motion.

Andrew Pelling: It is with some regret that I feel that I have not been able to make my case sufficiently well to persuade the Minister. However, I shall not detain the Committee by pressing the new clause to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Yvette Cooper: On a point of order, Lady Winterton. May I thank you and your co-Chairman for the professional and effective way in which you have refereed, supervised and assisted our scrutiny of the Bill? I thank you for your tolerance of some of the flights of fantasy and fancy in which we have engaged at times.
 I also thank the Clerks, Hansard Reporters and Doorkeepers for helping to make the business of the Committee smoother than it might otherwise have been. I particularly thank my hon. Friend the Minister for London for his hard work and support. I thank all my hon. Friends for their contributions and enthusiasm.
I also extend thanks to the Opposition spokesmen, the hon. Members for Surrey Heath and for Carshalton and Wallington, and their Opposition colleagues, for the way that they have made their points. This has been one of the most cheerful and entertaining Committees on which I have had the pleasure to serve; given some of the others, I am not sure how strong a compliment that is. This Committee has been cheerful and amiable throughout. I hope that on Report things will continue in that spirit.

Michael Gove: On a point of order, Lady Winterton. I associate myself completely with the remarks made by the Minister for Housing and Planning. It has been an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairmanship and that of your co-Chairman, Mr. O’Hara. The Committee has been an education for me and although it may have been a trial for you and Mr. O’Hara, I am grateful for your forbearance and patience.
 I am also grateful to the Clerks for their guidance during the Committee—and before it, when my hon. Friends and I were framing our amendments. I thank the Doorkeepers and Hansard Reporters for their kindness and support. I completely associate myself with the Minister’s remarks about the good humour and amiability with which the Committee has conducted its business. That is due in no small part to how she, the Minister for London and the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford have combined a firm hand on the Executive tiller with an indulgent smile for the Opposition’s sallies.
Before I came to this House, I paid close attention to comments made by the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) when he was Home Secretary. He said that there had never been a Bill for which he was responsible that had not been improved by its passage through the House of Commons, in particular the Committee stage. I rather admired his saying that, because it suggested a degree of open-mindedness that did him and his office credit.
However, I should like to place on the record that although I admire the Government’s generosity of spirit in their handling of this Bill, we have put forward a string of amendments and new clauses, not a single one of which has been accepted by them. We have laboured in vain, but I hope that on Report and on Third Reading the opportunity to reflect on the arguments that have been so faithfully committed into Hansard by the Reporters’ hands will lead the Ministers to think again. They may recognise that many of the arguments put forward by my hon. Friends—and, indeed, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington—deserve to be revisited and perhaps incorporated at one of those later stages.

Tom Brake: On a point of order, Lady Winterton. I thank you for your chairmanship and echo the thanks of the Minister and the hon. Gentleman to all those involved in ensuring that events have run smoothly. I agree that the debate has been good humoured, and I am sure that that approach will be maintained on Report and in the other place.
I have only one regret: that both the hon. Member for Surrey Heath and I will leave this Committee with no successful amendments to present to our mothers. However, we shall return to the issues later.

Ann Winterton: Before I put the question, I should like, on behalf of my co-Chairman Eddie O’Hara and myself, to respond to the kind remarks made by the Minister and the Opposition spokesmen. The Committee has debated some weighty matters constructively and good-humouredly. I say without contradiction that it has been the best and most interesting Bill that I have had the pleasure of chairing. I thank all Committee members for that.
I, too, thank the Doorkeepers, the police, the Hansard Reporters and in particular the Clerks, without whose expertise we would not be so well placed to debate and carry the Committee stage through in the traditional manner.
The great thing is that I get to blow the final whistle.

Ordered,
That certain memoranda already reported to the House be appended to the proceedings of the Committee.—[Yvette Cooper.]

Bill to be reported, without amendment.

Committee rose at two minutes past One o’clock.